



Napo Pharmaceuticals

The First Plant-Based Product Development Partnership

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The strategic dilemma

760,000

children under 5 die from diarrhea every year ^[24]

\$300M+ / 20 years / 0 patients reached at scale

what Napo has invested vs what we've delivered

"How do we get our drug to the patients who need it without losing it again?"



Who we are: Napo

20 years

of plant-based drug
development

**70
communities**

indigenous partners across 25
countries

2,300 plants

the largest ethnobotanical
library in pharma



The drug: crofelemer



Croton lechleri · the dragon's-blood tree

Crofelemer

First-ever oral plant-based FDA-approved drug^[1]

FDA approval: 31 December 2012

for HIV-associated diarrhea (40% of US HIV patients)^[2]



Diagnosis: why both partnerships failed

Salix Pharmaceuticals

2008

- Had a competing drug (Xifaxan)
- Missed FDA filing deadlines
- Sued May 2011, terminated Nov 2011 [4]

Glenmark Pharmaceuticals

2005

- Rights in 140 emerging-market countries
- 0 regulatory applications in 6 years
- Arbitration ongoing

Same root cause: misaligned incentives [10]



A different model exists

Product Development Partnership (PDP)

DNDi

14 treatments / 6 diseases ^[6]

MMV

**16 drugs / 811M patients
treated** ^[7]

Venture Philanthropy

CFF + Vertex

\$150M invested ^[8]

Result

\$3.3B royalty sale (2014) ^[9]

We propose: the first plant-based hybrid of these two models



SWOT analysis

Approved drug + scalable mission, but capital-light and litigation-shadowed



STRENGTHS

- 1 **FDA-approved** drug
- 2 **Largest** plant library in pharma
- 3 **20-year** supply chain



WEAKNESSES

- 1 **\$7–10M** cash
- 2 **No** sales force
- 3 **Phase 3 effect:** 17.6% vs 8% [2]



OPPORTUNITIES

- 1 **PDP** funding ecosystem
- 2 **Orphan drug** pathways [16, 17]
- 3 **Priority Review** Voucher [18]



THREATS

- 1 **Salix / Glenmark** litigation
- 2 **Parallel trade** in EU
- 3 **Big Pharma** competitor

NET READ

Defensible drug + unique platform; bridge cash and partner discipline are the win conditions.



Selection criteria + four pillars

Selection criteria



Cash preservation



Mission alignment



Strategic independence



Risk-adjusted EV

Four pillars

Pillar 1

Salix royalties

Pillar 2

NP-500

Pillar 3

Discovery platform

Pillar 4

**Venture
philanthropy + IGO**



Pillar 1: Salix royalty stream

\$4.5M

upfront

\$500K

equity

Royalties

tiered on sales ^[3]

Alternatives evaluated

Lawsuit

\$9M cost, market window may close

REJECTED

Glenmark appeal

cannot afford it now

REJECTED

Frozen partnership + passive royalties

preserves cash, captures upside

SELECTED



Pillar 2: NP-500 risk-sharing partnership

DEAL TERMS

\$3M

upfront

\$225M

milestones

7%

royalty

[26]

WHY IT MATTERS



Risk transfer



Non-dilutive



Credibility



Operational

CONTRACT DESIGN



Hard milestones



Quarterly reports



Carve-outs


30% higher FDA approval rate from pharma–biotech partnerships [14]



Pillar 3: Discovery platform as PDP hub




Three tracks




Pillar 4: Venture philanthropy + IGO distribution

CAPITAL IN



DRUG OUT



Bonus upside: Priority Review Voucher (FDASIA Section 908)^[18] HTA pricing: NICE / IQWiG^[13, 15]



Upside, protection, and risk

Three things investors should weigh: where it goes right, what protects us, and how we've planned for what could break.

UPSIDE

2



Track 1: Western markets

IBS — \$4B opportunity ^[27]



Track 2: Developing world

UNICEF / MSF / Global Fund

PROTECTION

3



Patents to 2028



Botanical Drug Guidance ^[19]



20-year supply chain

RISKS → MITIGATION 5

1 NP-500 delay → 4-pillar resilience

2 Salix never launches → Royalty pillar = 0

3 Parallel trade → IGO routing

4 Amazon supply chain → 4 countries

5 Competitor entry → Patents + moat



Financials — base case

Three-year cumulative — income, operating burn, ending cash.



BREAK-EVEN	BASE ROI	EXIT
Year 3	1.5–3×	\$50–100M / 3–5×



Sensitivity — does the plan survive?

Three downside scenarios, severity-coded by impact on the plan.

STILL VIABLE

20% slower NP-500 partnership

\$12M ending cash

MEANINGFUL HIT

Competitor enters earlier than expected

NP-500 deal value drops, but deal still happens

HEDGED BY DESIGN

Salix never launches commercially

Royalty pillar = 0

BOTTOM LINE

No single failure breaks the plan — that is the point of the four-pillar architecture.





"Three things have to be true at once for Napo to work: the drug reaches the patients who need it, the indigenous communities we work with share in the success, and the company makes enough money to keep going. The four pillars are how we do all three."

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